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purpose. Peregoy u. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 202 Md. 203,
95 A.2d 867 (1953). The only duty the occupier of the land owes
to a licensee is that if he becomes aware of the licensee's pre-
sence he must not injure him wilfully or wantonly or entrap him.
Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 287 A.2d 265 (1972).
An invitee is one who is invited or permitted to enter or re-
main on another's property for purposes connected with or re-
lated to the owner's business. The property owner must use
reasonable care to keep his premises safe for the invitee and to
protect him from harm caused by an unreasonable risk, which
the invitee will not discover even when ordinary care is
excercised on part of the invitee. Gray u. Sentinel Auto Parks
Co., 265 Md. 61, 288 A.2d 121 (1972); Lloyd v. Bowles, 260 Md.
568, 273 A.2d 193 (1971).
Traditionally, policemen have been held in most jurisdictions
to be licensees. The rationale for this classification is that they
are likely to enter at unforeseeable times, upon unusual parts of
the premises and during emergencies. The authorities state
that placing a duty upon the property owner to keep his pre-
mises reasonably safe would be too severe.
The plaintiff in this case advanced two principle arguments.
First, he asserted that the licensee status given him had
changed to invitee after the initial period of his anticipated oc-
cupational risk had passed. That is, when the suspects had
been apprehended. The court was of the opinion, however,
that the plaintiff was injured during, and not after, the initial
period of his anticipated occupational risk and from a hazard
reasonably foreseeable as a part of that risk. Therefore, the
plaintiff was not afforded the invitee status.
The plaintiff's second argument was that Maryland should
abolish the common law classifications of invitee, licensee and
trespasser and instead hold the property owners to a general
negligence standard of ordinary reasonable care.
The trend now exists where courts have either abandoned in
part or in whole the common law status classifications. The
trend's driving force began in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d
108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Ca. Rptr. 97 (1968), where the common
law classifications were rejected. The court stated that:
"A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protec-
tion by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under
the law because he has come upon the land of another with-
out permission or with permission but without a business
purpose. Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their con-
duct depending upon such matters, and to focus upon the
status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee
in order to determine the question whether the landowner
has a duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores
and humanitarian values."
69 Cal. 2d 118, 443 P.2d 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 104.
Instead of using the standard of classifications the California
Court found the proper test to be:
"whether in the management of his property he has acted as
a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to
others, and although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, li-
censee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to
such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the
status is not determinative."
Id. at 119, 443 P.2d 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 104.
In Woodward u. Newstein, 37 Md.App. 285, 377 A.2d 535
(1977), The Maryland Court of Special Appeals took note of
the modern trend of cases that would abolish the classes of in-
vitee, licensee, and trespassers. In that case the Court declined
to rule on the merits of the new wave of cases as the question
was not properly raised in the Court below. The court further
noted that the Court of Appeals should bear the burden of
deciding the issue.
The dissent by Judge Levine, in which Judge Eldridge
joined, strongly urged the abolition of the common law classifi-
cation status in exchange for the acceptance of general
negligence as the standard of care for the property owner. The
dissent stated that the common law approach was necessary to
protect a landowner's right to free use and enjoyment of his
property, but now, society's interest in the safety of people out-
weighs its interest in the property owner's unrestricted use of
his premises. Applying the common law classification generally
results in the inordinately severe treatment of the injured en-
trants. The distinctions between the classifications is inconsis-
tent with contemporary thinking about the function of tort law
in society. The dissent argues that the traditional rule affords a
property owner a special privilege to be careless.
It is only a matter of time before this jurisdiction imposes
upon landowners a duty not to create unreasonable risks of
harm to persons entering upon their premises. The dissenting
opinion suggests that the standard of care would depend upon
such factors as: (1) The likelihood that the conduct in question
will result in harm to others; (2) The gravity of such harm; and
(3) The cost of preventing the risks of injury.
Resolution of the issue presented here must wait for another
day. When that day arrives, and the issue is properly pre-
sented, the Maryland Court will probably abandon the old
common law status of invitee, licensee, and trespasser and
apply instead the standard of ordinary negligence in determin-




Products in Strict Tort
Liability: The Search for a
Standard
In products liability design defect cases, in order for a seller
to be strictly liable under Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, it generally must be shown that: (1) the
product was in a defective condition at the time it left the
possession or control of the seller; (2) that it was unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer; (3) that the defect was a
cause of the injuries; and (4) that the product was expected to
and did reach the consumer without substantial change in its
condition.
California, however, holds otherwise. In Barker v. Lull
Engineering Company, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), the Supreme Court of California restated
its elimination of the unreasonably dangerous requirement,
and further held that a trial judge may properly instruct the jury
that a product is defective in design if (1) the plaintiff demon-
strates that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended and
reasonably foreseeable manner, or if (2) the plaintiff proves that
the product's design proximately caused his injury and the
defendant fails to prove that, on balance, the benefits of the
FORUM
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design.
In Barker, the court was presented with a situation in which
the plaintiff-employee was injured because of an alleged design
defect in a fork-lift loader leased by plaintiff's employer from a
co-defendant of manufacturer Lull Engineering. The trial court
instructed the jury that strict liability for a design defect would
have to be based on a finding that the product was unreason-
ably dangerous for its intended use. The verdict was in favor of
the defendant. Barker appealed, contending that such an
instruction was ambiguous, and clearly contrary to the holding
in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), decided subsequently to Barker's
trial.
Acting Chief Justice Tobriner, writing for the court, agreed,
stating that the instruction failed in two respects. It did not give
adequate consideration to either (1) consumer expectations
which are often determinative of the defectiveness issue
regardless of any unreasonable danger rubric or (2) the
product's reasonably foreseeable use and not simply its
intended use. Barker, supra, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-427, 573 P.2d
443, 451-452, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 233-234.
Defendant Lull Engineering contended that the rejection of
the "unreasonably dangerous" criterion should be limited to
cases alleging manfacturing defects, and that in design defect
actions, plaintiff should have to prove the defect made the
product unreasonably dangerous, since, defendant argued, a
defect in design is defined by reference to the unreasonably
dangerous standard. 20 Cal. 3d at 424,573 P.2d at 450,143 Cal.
Rptr. at 232.
The court disagreed, noting that in California there is no real
distinction between manufacturing and design defects when
plaintiff is able to show the existence of a defect, and further
that "the Restatement's 'unreasonably dangerous' formulation
represented an undue restriction on the application of strict
liability principles." Id. at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at
233.
The court thus reiterated its flat rejection of the argument
that recovery should be permitted only if a product is more
dangerous than the potential of risk contemplated by the
average consumer, thereby refusing to "permit the low esteem
in which the public might hold a dangerous product to diminish
the manufacturer's responsibility for injuries caused by that
product." Id. Therefore, a consumer may recover from an
injury even though the defect in the product was patent and the
risk and resultant injury foreseeable.
After discarding the unreasonably dangerous standard, the
court reviewed a number of California cases, discussing the
definition of defect and the allocation of the burden of proof
with respect to the considerations relevant to a determination
of the adequacy of a product's design.
The court found that when a product fails to satisfy ordinary
consumer expectations as to safety in its intended or reason-
ably foreseeable use, the manufacturer is strictly liable for
resulting injuries. Under this standard, defectiveness can often
be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence, including
situations where there is no specific identification of the defect
at fault. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 227.
However, the expectation of the ordinary consumer is not
the exclusive yardstick for evaluating design defectiveness;
often the "consumer would not know what to expect, because
he would have no idea how safe the product could be made." 20
Cal. 3d 430, 573 P.2d 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 234.
The court thus postulated another standard by which a jury
may impose liability if it finds that the risk of danger inherent in
the challenged design outweighs the benefits of that design. Id.
The court noted that a principal purpose behind the strict
liability doctrine is to remove evidentiary burdens from a plain-
tiff otherwise required in negligence actions. Therefore, once a
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the injury was
proximately caused by the product's design, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant who must then prove by either
circumstantial or direct evidence that the product is not
defective. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., supra, 20 Cal.
3d 431, 573 P.2d 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 237.
The court concluded by noting that this two-pronged test of
defectiveness "subjects the manufacturer to liability whenever
there is something wrong with its product's design. . .while
stopping short of making the manufacturer an insurer for all
injuries which may result from the use of its product." Page 432
of 20 Cal. 3d, 573 P.2d 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 238.
Maryland differs from the Barker approach in at least three
respects. In Maryland, in order to demonstrate liability, plain-
tiff must prove not only the existence of a defect proximately
causing injury, but also that the product was dangerous to a
degree beyond that which the ordinary consumer would
expect; the ordinary consumer is held to a knowledge common
to the community as to the product's characteristics. Thus,
while California focuses on individual expectations, Maryland
looks to the reasonable man standard usually applicable in
negligence cases and to comment i of section 402A of the
Restatement. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md.
337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
In addition, Maryland distinguishes between defects in
design and defects in manufacture. In Volkswagen of America
u. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974), the Court of
Appeals, in construing the applicability of strict liability in a
second-collision, design defect case, held that the "thrust of
Sec. 402A is that a seller of any product in a defective condition
is liable to a user for harm caused by that defective condition
even though the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product. This principle obviously
changes the standard of care with regard to a construction
defect, but as to a defect in design, it has no special meaning."
272 Md. 221, 321 A.2d 747.
This conclusion explains the third distinquishing character-
istic between strict liability design defect cases brought in
Maryland and those litigated in California. In Maryland, strict
liability is not applicable in cases where liability is dependant
upon the showing of a design defect. In Phipps, supra, the
Court of Appeals concluded that where a product is in a condi-
tion not intended by the seller, there is less difficulty in applying
the defectiveness test of section 402A. However, where a
design defect is alleged, traditional negligence standards apply,
since the element of unreasonable danger requires a weighing
of the utility of the benefits inherent in the design against the
magnitude of the risk. Phipps, supra, at 345, 363 A.2d at 959.
Even Maryland, however, recognizes that "unreasonably
dangerous" is not the same in different contexts, and plaintiff's
proof will vary depending on the very nature of the product
involved. Thus in Eaton Corporation v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375
A.2d 1122 (1977), the plaintiff, by showing merely that highly
flammable gas continued to be released from a hand-held
propane gas canister after the torch head was properly
removed, presented a prima facie showing of unreasonable
danger. 281 Md. at 89, 375 A.2d 1127.
Since strict liability does not require a perfectly safe product,
but rather one that is reasonably safe, the Barker court may
have gone too far in holding a manufacturer liable for a defect.
Nevertheless, the court made clear that a case-by-case analysis
would be proper, and a working definition of "defect" could be
established based on case law decisions involving similar
circumstances or products.
Whether one accepts or rejects the unreasonably dangerous
test in the Restatement's language, proof of a defect is a sine
qua non in products liability actions. Hopefully, the developing
case law will provide a more workable standard by which
defectiveness can be measured; until then, the Barker case
represents a positive attempt to eliminate negligence principles






by Thomas G. Ross
While there are numerous exceptions to the general rule that
hearsay evidence is inadmissible in formal court proceedings,
Rule 804 (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for only
five categories of hearsay exceptions where the declarant is
unavailable.' The basic premise behind admitting such
evidence is the reliability factor surrounding the circum-
stances at the time a statement was made. These circum-
stances provide a substitute guarantee of reliability. Such
guarantee is necessary in order to admit testimony which may
be crucial to the outcome of the case.
Historically, the best safeguard against unreliable testimony
has been the right of opposing parties to cross-examine
adverse witnesses. The admission of hearsay evidence restricts
this ability in that it depends for its probative value upon the
testimony of someone not subject to cross-examination. For
this reason, the Rule 804 (b) exceptions are limited to cir-
cumstances that are theoretically so reliable as to overcome
the right in the opposing party to cross-examine the declarant.
The recent decision in United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131
(4th Cir. 1978), addresses itself to the admission of hearsay
testimony of an unavailable declarant and the defendants' right
of confrontation.
At trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, West and his two co-defendants were con-
victed of distribution of heroin and possession with intent to
distribute heroin, both violations of the Controlled Substance
Act, 21 U.S.C. §841 et seq.
2
1. 1) Former testimony, 2) Dying declaration; 3) Statement against Interest; 4)
Statement of personal or family history; 5) Other exceptions.
2. FACTS: The testimony of an unavailable declarant, Michael V. Brown, played
a critical role in the convictions of West and his co defendants. Brown had
volunteered to assist the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in its
investigation. At the time, he was incarcerated with a pending drug charge as well
as a parole violation detainer.
Under police surveillance, Brown purchased heroin from the defendants.
Several of his telephone calls to the defendants in which he set up a "buy" were
monitored, a transmitter was concealed on Brown to tape-record the conversa
tions; law enforcement officials observed and photographed Brown's meetings
with the defendants.
Before each transaction, Brown was searched for drugs and given money to
purchase heroin. According to the government's evidence, transactions took
place between Brown and West on three occasions, and three similar "deals"
were made between Brown and the two co-defendants.
The trial judge allowed the admission of the grand jury
testimony of Michael V. Brown, the unavailable declarant,
under Rule 804 (b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 He
noted that "under the circumstances, it [a transcript of
Brown's grand jury testimony] was essential and trustworthy."
574 F.2d at 1134.
The government's evidence at trial included photographs,
the transcript of Brown's grand jury testimony, testimony by an
expert in voice identification, and the purchased heroin. Also
offered as further corroboration of Brown's testimony were
tapes of Brown's conversations with the defendants and testi
mony of Drug Enforcement Administration agents regarding
their observations. Arrest records, as well as transcripts of
Brown's tape-recorded conversations with the defendants
were made available to defense coursed.
I. HEARSAY
Hearsay evidence is testimony, in court, or written
evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement
being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters
asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the
credibility of the out-of-court asserter. (emphasis added)
McCormick, Evidence, §246 at 584 (2d Edition, 1972).
Defendants contended that the trial court erred in admitting
the transcript of Brown's grand jury testimony. While it was not
contested that the transcript of that testimony met the neces-
sary criteria of clauses (A), (B) and (C) of Rule 804 (b) (5) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the defendants argued that the
provision had not been satisfied because the admitted state-
ments failed to have the requisite "equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" as statements admitted under
any of the preceding four paragraphs of the rule (Rule 804 (b)
[1] [4]). Their contention was that the admission of Brown's
grand jury testimony was far less trustworthy than the other
Rule 804 (b) provisions required, and that the legislative history
of the rule provided that the provision was to be applicable only
After each transaction, DEA agents would search Brown and his car for
contraband. Brown would then return to the DEA office where he would meet
with a DEA agent to discuss and compose a summary of the events that took
place. They would also listen to the tape recordings.
On March 8, 1976, the defendants were indicted without Brown's testimony.
On March 16, 1976, however, Brown testified before a grand jury investigating
Virginia drug traffic.
In exchange for his cooperation, the government entered a nolle prosequi to
the pending drug charge against Brown and dismissed the detainer. He was given
$855 as a form of "protection" and released. On March 19, 1976, Brown was
murdered "contract-style," i.e. four bullets into the back of his head while he
was driving his car.
3. Rule 804 (b) (5) provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the fore-
going exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust
worthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the state
ment into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party suffi-
ciently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and
the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
